Civil Courts Introducing a New Intimate Partner Violence Tort: Coercive and Controlling Behaviour and the Potential Benefits to Victims for Access to Justice [ Part 1 ]
Author: Caitlin Damm
Introduction
Snapshot: Intimate Partner Violence and Coercive Control
Statistics draw attention to how many individuals experience abuse at some point in their life. In Canada, police data show that in 2024 there were high levels of family violence (FV) with 349 victims per 100,000 population and for intimate partner violence (IPV) 356 per 100,000 population among those aged 12 and older.[i] Women and children are disproportionately represented among victims of IPV and coercive and controlling behaviour (CCB).[ii] The statistics may not reflect the true prevalence as many victims of IPV and FV do not report incidents to authorities.[iii] Manitoba is one of the provinces in Canada that holds a higher rate of FV and IPV.[iv]
The statistics highlight how IPV is a serious issue in Canada. Ultimately, our society and the law are starting to recognize the seriousness of CCB that may happen in an abusive intimate partner relationship. Unfortunately, CCB may not be as apparent as abuse that may be physical or easy to recognize. For instance, CCBs can range from “acts of humiliation, intimidation, isolation, exploitation and/or manipulation, frequently accompanied by acts of physical or sexual coercion.”[v] Even though society is recognizing the harms of CCBs, the courts are doing so as well.
This discussion will examine how Canadian courts have begun recognizing CCB within civil law, regarding the new intimate partner violence tort, and whether the tort will improve access to justice for survivors. The important questions are: how are the courts recognizing the harms of CCB? And what are the potential positives of the courts recognizing and providing legal consequences for this type of abuse?
Access to Justice: Benefits of New IPV Tort
For the first time in Canada, the case Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] established a new IPV tort that recognizes CCB and the harm that victims experience.[vi] The case raises questions about the benefits that may arise from the newly developed law of the IPV tort. Some potential benefits are how the new tort law may (1) help individuals seek justice outside the criminal justice system; and (2) the case may create guidance for judges in criminal law on how to enforce CCB; and (3) may create a progression in human rights obligations for access to justice in protecting women. But first, it is crucial to understand what the new IPV tort is and how the courts define and recognize the harm experienced by victims of CCB.
Learning about the IPV Tort in the Court of Law
Differences Between the New and Existing IPV Torts
The leading case Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, before the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) found that it is important to establish a new tort for IPV and CCB.[vii] The Court addressed that existing torts fail to remedy the unique harms of CCB that are specific to a survivor’s “dignity, autonomy, and equality that intimate partner violence creates.”[viii] For example, existing torts for IPV recognize only isolated events of immediate harm of physical assault, which leaves out remedies for survivors to seek justice for capturing CCB acts such as “manipulation, isolation, or financial abuse.”[ix] Unlike traditional torts that focus on IPV, the new tort recognizes CCB harm that is not necessarily immediate, and that the psychological harm may not link to physical assault, but involves a “generalization of future harm” that causes fear for the victim.[x] The new tort does not require the victim to prove the harm from the CCB, which is a drastic change to the law in civil court.
Evidentiary Changes Under the New IPV Tort
A crucial aspect of the new IPV tort is understanding how the evidentiary requirements differ from those of previous IPV torts. For example, evidence of psychological illness plays a crucial role in existing torts where a victim has to prove emotional or psychological illness from the abuse, and CCB does not always produce evidence of a psychological illness.[xi] Now, victims pursuing damages do not need to separately prove “consequential harm” arising from a psychological illness from the abuse to meet the thresholds of the new tort.[xii] This is significant since an individual who experiences CCB behaviour and is in fear does not necessarily mean that the individual has a psychological illness.
Thresholds of Meeting Requirements of the New IPV Tort
Lastly, there are three thresholds that must be established for meeting the requirements of the new IPV tort for a survivor seeking damages for the harm. The new tort of IPV thresholds for establishing CCB, the “plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath; (2) the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and (3) the conduct, on an objective measure, constitutes coercive control.”[xiii] The evidence of abuse must establish a connection that directly relates to the CCB in an intimate partner relationship.[xiv] The CCB must interfere with the victim’s “dignity, autonomy, and equality.”[xv] The threshold helps establish the legal test that must be met in the court of law for a victim to seek justice and compensation for the abuse.
How the New Tort Potentially Creates Access to Justice for Victims
Criminal Law, Civil Law, IPV and CCB
In addition to IPV rates in Canada being high and the potential impacts that Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia may have in the legal system, the IPV tort allows other justice remedies for victims of CCB outside criminal courts. For example, IPV is a criminal offence when acts of “physical and sexual assault, harassment, uttering threats, and coercive controlling behaviours” take place.[xvi] CCB just became an offence under the Criminal Code on June 18, 2026, reaching Royal Assent under Bill C-16.[xvii] Section 261.04 creates a new offence that prohibits engaging in a pattern of coercive or controlling conduct towards an intimate partner.[xviii]
Judges in criminal law prior to the criminalisation of CCB on June 18, 2026, were or may define IPV as being “sexual and psychological violence, threats, coercive control, physical violence, isolation and stalking, economic abuse, and threats to take children away.”[xix] For instance, in the case R v Herrington [2025], the judge recognized CCB and considered the behaviour to be an aggravating factor in sentencing outcomes, but not a distinct offence on its own, prior to criminalisation.[xx] Now that CCB is a distinct offence, this could potentially affect sentencing outcomes and how lawyers, judges, and the police recognize patterns of CCB as criminal conduct rather than isolated incidents.
Now, CCB can be a distinct criminal offence rather than considered just an aggravating factor. Despite the recent legal reform in the criminal code addressing IPV and CCB, the SCC case Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia adds a new IPV tort allowing victims to sue for damages in civil law for CCB. It is important to think critically about how a case can impact the legal system, and access to justice for victims.
Criminal Law Judgment Outcomes and Access to Justice through Civil Law
A way that Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia can provide access to justice for a victim outside criminal court, is by pursuing a claim in civil court. Even with CCB being criminalized, an issue may arise when it comes to access to justice in criminal law in finding the accused guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.”[xxi] Therefore, the new tort can give a victim a chance to prove their case in civil court by establishing the defendant’s liability for harm under the “balance of probabilities” threshold. The case FH v McDougall [2008] explains the threshold of balance of probability that the judge needs to distinguish “whether it is more likely than not that an alleged event has occurred.”[xxii]
Therefore, the victim can access justice through civil court to seek monetary remedies. For instance, in the case R v Parsons [2020] the judge finds CCB in the intimate partner relationship involving the offence of distributing intimate images and harassment in which the accused is found guilty, the victim could potentially seek an additional remedy through the new IPV tort.[xxiii] Understanding different types of thresholds that the courts use in criminal and civil cases shows how this may affect access to justice for victims.
Criminalisation of CCB and Bill C-16
Turning to the possible ways the case Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia may create guidance for judges in criminal law on how to address CCB. The Canadian Bar Association (CBA) states the language of the Bill C-16 in regard to CCB gives “no direction as to whether the acts constituting the pattern must be temporally connected or can be spread out over several years.”[xxiv] The CBA mentions that the language of Bill C-16 does not establish whether or not the pattern is restricted to when the intimate partner relationship is ongoing but should extend to periods following dissolution of the relationship.”[xxv]
The case may guide judges on defining the interpretation and construction of the words “pattern or cumulation” in section 264.01 in Bill C-16.[xxvi] For example, Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia establishes that “a single act of violence, when considered in context, may objectively constitute coercive control if its impact on the victim undermines their dignity, autonomy, and equality within the relationship.”[xxvii] This may give a more contextual understanding of the word “pattern” establishing that it “does not mean that only multiple acts of abuse qualify as coercive control, but calls on judges to be attuned to the context in which a wrongful act or acts occurred, including the power dynamics of the intimate partnership and any subtle acts that may appear innocuous in isolation.”[xxviii]
The case also extends the application of the IPV tort to CCB during an intimate partner relationship and after separation.[xxix] The takeaway here is that a case does not have to arise exclusively in criminal or civil law to make changes in different types of court hearings; a case can affect all different areas of law.
Progressing in Human Rights Obligations for Access to Justice in Protecting Women
Lastly, a potential benefit to how the new tort may help protect women from violence, is how the case symbolizes progression in human rights obligations. The case Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia may help progression of protecting women from all forms of gender-based violence by providing a legal reform in civil law and creating monetary remedies for victims who experience IPV and CCB behaviours. [xxx] The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the Tenth Periodic Report, describes the importance of offering better protection for women for civil remedies for IPV.[xxxi] Also, the case helps progression in protecting women in expanding the recognized harms of domestic violence from being recognized as just physical violence, but to extend to CCB.[xxxii]
Conclusion
The new IPV tort established in Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia addresses evidentiary gaps and harms that previous IPV torts did not recognize if the abuse does not involve immediate harm of physical assault. The tort recognizes CCB as a wrong that causes harm to the victim’s dignity, autonomy, and equality within an intimate partner relationship. Thresholds of the tort cover IPV during and post-separation, the abuse must be intentional and meeting the objective meaning of CCB. The Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia decision could provide judges in criminal law guidance on enforcing and recognizing CCB. Access to justice for victims may become difficult in criminal proceedings where the applicable burden of proof is higher than in civil proceedings, and the new tort allows another avenue for possible justice. Lastly, the new IPV tort may create progression in access to justice in protecting women from IPV and CCB in terms of civil law and legal reform.
Endnotes:
[i] Government of Canada, “Trends in Police-Reported Family Violence and Intimate Partner Violence in Canada, 2024” (28 October 2025), online: <150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/251028/dq251028a-eng.htm> [perma.cc/4SCH-KVZG]. The definition for “family violence” and “intimate partner violence” are different in meaning. The definition of family violence is “[v]iolence committed by spouses, parents, children, siblings and extended family members.” The definition of intimate partner violence is “violence committed by current and former legally married spouses, common-law partners, dating partners and other intimate partners.” Although, “[v]ictims of family violence and victims of intimate partner violence are not mutually exclusive groups, since victims of a current or former spouse or common-law partner are included in both groups.” It is important to understand the definition of a specific word as meanings and context become important when understanding the law.
[ii] Iqra Khalid (Chair; House of Commons Canada), “The Shadow Pandemic: Stopping Coercive and Controlling Behaviour in Intimate Relationships…Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights” (April 2021), online (pdf): <ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/432/JUST/Reports/RP11257780/justrp09/justrp09-e.pdf> [perma.cc/8VMX-5P58] at 4. Studies show that domestic violence (DV) and CCB is a real issue in Canada, and “[t]he great majority of abusive partners or ex-partners are men, whereas the victims are generally women and children.” CCB “is present in 95% of relationships where there’s domestic violence.”
[iii] Government of Canada, supra note i. “[T]hese types of violence are often not reported to authorities, since victims may, for example, be unaware that they are being victimized, may not know how to seek help, may be unable to report their victimization and may be dependent on the perpetrator.”
[iv] Ibid. Statistically the rates of FV and IPV “[w]ere in Saskatchewan (737 victims of family violence and 714 victims of intimate partner violence per 100,000 population) and Manitoba (568 for family violence and 607 for intimate partner violence).”
[v] Peter G. Jaffe et al, “Coercive control as a form of family violence” (February 2023), online (pdf): <justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/rib-reb/mpafvc-capcvf/pdf/RSD_2023_MakingAppropriatebrochure-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/54E8-8CX4] at 3. Coercive and controlling behaviours are being recognized by law, not just in the criminal justice system or civil law tort system, but as a “form of family violence in the Divorce Act and most provincial and territorial family laws.”
[vi] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 at para 1 [Ahluwalia]. Available online (pdf): < https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/21505/1/document.do>.
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Ibid at p 9. The SCC explains, “certain existing torts may capture discrete incidents, or even patterns, of interference with one’s physical, psychological, or emotional integrity, they do not account for the wider and qualitatively different consequences of coercive control in intimate partnerships brought about by single acts of violence or by patterns of conduct over time.”
[ix] Ibid at p 10. The SCC states, “the tort of assault cannot capture the many forms that intimate partner violence can take — such as manipulation, isolation, or financial abuse — which do not necessarily arouse a fear of imminent contact, and whose cumulative coercive effects over its victim only appear over time.”
[x] Ibid. The SCC explains why existing torts did not cover CCB. It is because “coercive control creates a generalized fear of future harm, which is different from imminent harm.” Also, “the physical and psychological injury resulting from incidents of battery and assault remain distinct from the victim’s subordination in the relationship to which they contributed.” Therefore, “while damages may be awarded to compensate for emotional harm arising from battery and assault, the harm is a result of specific incidents, rather than the generalized fear that characterizes the state of subordination.” In conclusion, “the existing torts of assault and battery are inadequate to compensate a victim for the distinct wrongs associated with coercive control resulting in the loss of dignity, autonomy, and equality as an intimate partner.”
[xi] Ibid at p 11. The SCC states, “to make out liability under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a victim of intimate partner violence must prove they suffer from a visible and provable illness that is serious and prolonged and rises above the ordinary annoyances, anxieties and fears that people living in society routinely, if sometimes reluctantly, accept.” If a victim is “absent [of] proof of visible symptoms of emotional distress, a plaintiff will find themselves without remedy.” Therefore, “this tort is ill-suited for methods of coercion that do not produce a visible and provable psychological illness.”
[xii]Ibid at para 184.
[xiii] Ibid.
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] Government of Canada, “Canada makes femicide first-degree murder as all three major Criminal Code reforms become law” (19 June 2026), online: <canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2026/06/canada-makes-femicide-first-degree-murder-as-all-three-major-criminal-code-reforms-become-law.html> [perma.cc/2KF9-BVQ6]. The new offence in the Criminal Code coercive control in intimate relationships is made for “targeting patterns of threats, isolation, or manipulation before violence escalates.” See also Government of Canada, “Family Violence Laws” (last modified 17 May 2024), online: <justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/fv-vf/laws-lois.html> [perma.cc/S8N7-8HN7]. Offences that address IPV and FV are “related to the use of physical and sexual violence such as: …assault (causing bodily harm, with a weapon and aggravated assault) (ss. 265-268) … kidnapping & forcible confinement (s. 279) … trafficking in persons (ss. 279.01); abduction of a young person (ss. 280-283); homicide - murder, attempted murder, infanticide and manslaughter (ss. 229-231 and 235) … sexual assault (causing bodily harm, with a weapon and aggravated sexual assault) (ss. 271-273) … sexual offences against children and youth (ss. 151, 152, 153, 155 and 170-172) … [and] child pornography (s. 163.1).” Offences that are “related to some forms of psychological or emotional abuse within the family that involve using words or actions to control, isolate, intimidate or dehumanize someone such as: … criminal harassment (sometimes called "stalking") (s. 264) … uttering threats (s. 264.1) … making indecent and harassing phone calls (s. 372) … trespassing at night (s. 177) … [and] mischief (s. 430).”
[xvii] Bill C-16, An Act to amend certain Acts in relation to criminal and correctional matters (child protection, gender-based violence, delays and other measures), 1st Sess, 45th Parl, Canada, 2026, s 264.01(1), online: <parl.ca/Content/Bills/451/Government/C-16/C-16_4/C-16_4.PDF>.
[xviii] Ibid.
[xix] Ava J Bowns, Crystal J Giesbrecht & Kaila C Bruer, “How Judges in Canadian Criminal Courts Define Intimate Partner Violence” (2024) 9:2 Journal of Community Safety and Well-Being 81 at 85.
[xx] R v Herrington, 2025 ONCJ 450 at para 31, online: R v Herrington, 2025 ONCJ 450.
[xxi] Justice Education Society (JES), “Justice System” (August 2020) online: <courtsofbc.ca/justice-system/criminal>. The meaning of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard of proof is close to absolute certainty but does not mean it has to be 100% certain.” This is “a higher standard than in civil law.”
[xxii] FH v McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII) at p 43, online: <canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2008/2008scc53/2008scc53.pdf>. The decision describes the balance of probabilities in civil law cases. For example, “in every civil case, a judge should be mindful of, and, depending on the circumstances, may take into account, the seriousness of the allegations or consequences or inherent improbabilities, but these considerations do not alter the standard of proof.” In terms of evidence, “one legal rule applies in all cases and that is that the evidence must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge in deciding whether it is more likely than not that an alleged event has occurred.” Lastly, “the evidence must always be clear, convincing and cogent in order to satisfy the balance of probabilities test”.
[xxiii] R v Parsons, 2020 CanLII 90498 (NL PC) at para 36. In relation to the criminal offences of distributing intimate images and harassment, the judge emphasized that CCB in this case included “threats of violence, humiliation, intimidation and financial ruin by taking away her school funding.”
[xxiv] Canadian Bar Association (CBA) “Bill C-16: Protecting Victims Act” (February 2026) Criminal, Family, Child and Youth Law Sections and Women’s Law Forum, online: https://cba.org/getmedia/08557216-a40c-49ca-8011-f5dfe66a2f0f/26-14-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/VE8N-YZNU] at p 15-16.
[xxv] Ibid.
[xxv] Lisa Ha, “Brief Overview of Coercive Control and the Criminal Law” (last modified 13 May 2024), online (Government of Canada): <justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rd17-rr17/p4.html> [perma.cc/X9S8-SXSJ].
[xxvi] CBA, supra note xxiv. The CBA recommends that “[c]larity should also be provided that the pattern is not restricted to when the intimate partner relationship is ongoing but should also extend to periods following dissolution of the relationship, although the length of this period may require assessment on a case-by-case basis.” The CBA explains that the “current language in subsection (2) ‘any combination, or repeated instances, of any of the following acts’ is insufficient.” The CBA reasons are that “[w]hile the shift toward a pattern-based approach aligns the Criminal Code with the Divorce Act, the lack of a clear threshold for frequency creates significant risks in the criminal law context”. The concerns are that “this is unlike the dangerous offender context, in which even two acts have been found to constitute a pattern”. CBA gives an explanation that this “presents a risk and a low bar to intimate partner relationships, where complex dynamics risk capturing unrelated incidents that do not merit criminal sanctions.”
[xxvii] Ahluwalia, supra note vi at para 192.
[xxviii] Ibid.
[xxix] Ibid at para 185. The SCC explains the context of what constitutes an intimate partner relationship stating, “first, the impugned conduct must arise in the context of an intimate partnership or its aftermath.” Also, “the personal connection, the intimacy that comes with such partnership, and the partners’ interdependence and attending vulnerabilities shape the intimate partnership during its lifetime and can persist after separation or the formal end of the relationship.”
[xxx] Ibid at para 140. The SCC explains that “[w]hile certain existing torts may capture discrete incidents — or even patterns — of interference with one’s physical, psychological, or emotional integrity, they do not account for the wider and qualitatively different consequences of coercive control in intimate partnerships brought about by single acts of violence or by patterns of conduct over time.”
[xxxi] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General Recommendation No 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General Recommendation No 19 (26 July 2017), UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/35, online (pdf): <docs.un.org/en/CEDAW/C/GC/35> [perma.cc/D22U-ZGLZ] at para 29 (p 11). The Committee recommends that State parties shall “(a) [e]nsure that all forms of gender-based violence against women in all spheres, which amount to a violation of their physical, sexual or psychological integrity, are criminalized and introduce, without delay, or strengthen, legal sanctions commensurate with the gravity of the offence, as well as civil remedies.”
[xxxii] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Tenth Periodic Report of Canada, CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/10 (16 October 2024) online: https://www.refworld.org/policy/polrec/cedaw/2024/149249 at para 24. CEDAW’s recommendations in implementing “[l]egislation to expand the definitions of domestic violence to non-physical forms of abuse in domestic violence cases, including emotional and psychological abuse as well as coercive control, and ensure comprehensive protection of women experiencing domestic violence.”
