R v Poulin - Lesser of Two Sentences?
Updated: 6 days ago
Author: M Levi
Poulin was found guilty of sexual offences committed between 1979 and 1987 in 2016. He was charged with one count of sexual assault as well as two counts of gross indecency, against ss. 157 and 246.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. At the time of the offences, the complainant was 7-15 years old while P was 44-51 years old. By the time P was sentenced, he was 82 years old and had a number of health issues.
At trial, P argued that he should receive a conditional sentence due to these health issues. The trial judge accepted P’s argument and sentenced him to a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day. A conditional sentence is a sentence of less than two years that is served in the community, a common example being house arrest. These types of sentences became available as forms of punishment in 1996, after P had committed the sexual offences but prior to his sentencing.
The trial judge relied on s.11(i) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in sentencing P to his conditional sentence. S.11(i) of the Charter states that “any person charged with an offence has the right if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment”. As such, the trial judge sentenced P to the lesser punishment of a conditional sentence. However, in appealing to the Court of Appeal as well as the Supreme Court of Canada, the Crown argues that s.11(i) of the Charter applies only to what the punishment was at the time of commission and the punishment at the time of sentencing, but not to the time in between the two acts. The question here for the Supreme Court of Canada is what the offender is entitled to under s.11(i) – is it a binary right or a global right?
By definition, a binary right is one that comparing the punishments at two points in time, whereas a global right would allow for an offender to receive the least severe punishment for the particular offence in the entire time between commission and sentencing. A global right is one that compares all of the punishments that have been available between the time of committing the offence and the time of sentencing.
In the past, courts have favoured the global approach to s.11(i) due to two different factors. The first is the use of “between”; courts have argued that this word indicates that the entire time between the offence and sentencing is included by the right of s.11(i). The second factor considered by courts is the principle of liberal interpretation of Charter rights, which means that Charter rights should be interpreted in ways that are most favourable to the offender.
This court however states that there is a missing element to these decisions – an analysis of the purposes of s.11(i). A Charter right needs to be interpreted while taking into account the purpose(s) behind it. This includes the language chosen as well as the historical aspects of the concepts in the specific right. Additionally, the court states that previous courts who have seen s.11(i) as a global right have been mistaken in prioritizing a liberal interpretation over the purpose of the right. Instead, it should have been a liberal interpretation of the right within the boundaries of the purpose behind the right.
In determining the true meaning of s.11(i) of the Charter, the court says that this section presents a binary right; this conclusion means that an offender is not entitled to a reduction in their punishment due to a change in punishment which occurred in the time between committing the crimes and sentencing, as they have no connection to the conduct of the offender or the sentencing standards at sentencing. The court states that this interpretation of s.11(i) is a fair one, as it would be unfair to sentence an offender to a punishment that Parliament has recognized is not appropriate by choosing to reduce it. This right also guarantees that the punishment applicable at the time of the commission of the crime will be seen as a “ceiling”, such that they will not receive a punishment more severe.
In determining how the wording of the right can confer either a binary or global right, the court looks at the words “between” and “lesser”. Poulin says that the word “between” demonstrates an intent to include the punishments available for the time between commission and sentencing, but the court disagrees. They say that the word “between” does not tell us whether s.11(i) is a binary or a global right, but that the right is concerned with the scenario where the punishment has changed “between” the time the crime was committed and the time of sentencing. The Crown argued that the use of the word “lesser” creates a comparison between two options, and the court agrees. They compare the use of this word to the use of words such as “better”, “higher”, and “faster”, which are typically used to compare two options against one another.
The court goes on to describe why it is not rational to see s.11(i) as a global right. The judges here state that this interpretation of s.11(i) would allow offenders who are sentences years or decades after the commission of the offence to benefit. This is especially relevant in cases of sexual assault, where the offence can go unreported for years.
Additionally, a global interpretation of s.11(i) would have some unwanted consequences. First, it would bring back punishments that Parliament has rejected. Second, it would not be practical for lawyers and judges to have to find and compare all of the sentencing provisions that have applied to the particular offence since the time the offence was committed to the date the offender was sentenced. This could not have been the intent when creating s.11(i).
As such, the court rules to allow the Crown’s appeal. They state that the conditional sentence Poulin received was not applicable to his offences either at the time the offence was committed or at the time of sentencing. While the punishment for P will not change due to his passing before this decision, the case has set out the true interpretation of s.11(i) as a binary right, while giving a guide for future courts to do the same for other rights as needed.

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