Waterfield Powers: What they Leave Uncertain

Updated: 3 days ago
Author: J Robinson
In Canada, police powers are determined by statute and common law. The ancillary powers doctrine, also known as the Waterfield test, is a mechanism that permits the Supreme Court of Canada to create new common law powers for police officers. The Waterfield test gives power to police to investigate and detain citizens on behalf of the state.[1] Notably, the ancillary powers doctrine allows the Court to retroactively give powers to police. In this context, there is a balance between crime prevention and individual liberties – the question to consider is whether the Waterfield test gives power to some while impeding that of others.[2]
The Supreme Court of Canada deployed the Waterfield test in R. v. Dedman, a landmark Ontario case. In its decision, the Court used Waterfield to justify and create new police powers pertaining to arbitrary roadside stops.[3] This case was first heard in the Ontario Provincial Court and eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court of Canada. The facts of the case were as follows: the accused was one of the drivers randomly signalled to pull over by police participating in the R.I.D.E. program.[4] This program was designed to detect impaired drivers in areas where police believed there to be a high incidence of impaired driving.[5] Significantly, the R.I.D.E. program was the only reason police requested him to stop – the police did not have any probable grounds that the accused had committed a criminal offence under federal or provincial statute.[6] During the stop, the police officer noticed a strong smell of alcohol on the accused and as such, ordered that he provide a breath sample. The accused was ultimately charged with failing to comply with a road-side demand contrary to s. 243.1(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada.[7]
The issue in Dedman was whether police had statutory or common law authority to necessitate the accused to stop his vehicle and if not, whether the accused could be convicted of refusing or failing to provide a breath sample.[8] The accused was acquitted at Provincial Court; however, the decision was appealed, and the case eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court of Canada.
When it was heard at the Supreme Court, the issue was framed in terms of whether the accused’s Charter right was violated during the officer’s execution of police duties.[9] The majority at the Court, in finding that the trial judge erred in its decision, applied the Waterfield test. In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the random roadside stop was “prima facie unlawful interference with liberty since it was not authorized by statute”, but that it fell “within the general scope of police duties to prevent crime and protect life”[10]. The Supreme Court of Canada, in applying the ancillary powers doctrine, established new common law authority for police to stop and detain citizens.
Since this decision in the 1980s, the concept of random roadside stops has become customary throughout Canada. The reality of being pulled over at a check stop by the police is so commonplace, particularly around the holiday season, that it is often an unremarkable event in the lives of citizens. This increase in arbitrary roadside stops can be attributed to the growth in police power as a result of the Dedman decision. Most people believe that preventing impaired driving is a social good, and thus comply with police officer’s requests. Despite its reception and integration into Canadian lives and automobiles, Waterfield has not been without its criticisms.
The issues surrounding the test and its application were echoed by Chief Justice Dickson in his dissenting opinion in the Dedman decision. The dissent held that because police did not have statutory or common law authority to randomly stop drivers, the unlawful demand was invalid, and the charge against the accused should be dismissed.[11] The dissenting judges went on to say that although the police have a general duty to protect society and prevent crime, this does not give them free reign to use any and all means necessary for achieving these ends.[12] In granting the police common law power to investigate and detain has come with a price, namely in the form of diminished rights, freedoms, and privacy of citizens. Scholars have also voiced their concerns with Waterfield, stating that “the test was being used as a gap filling measure..to expand police powers on a case-by-case basis”[13]. Since ancillary powers cannot be predicted, an individual who is targeted by a search existing in these “legal grey areas” has no way of knowing if his or her rights and liberties have been breached”[14]. Given the ad hoc nature of the test, citizens are left to navigate ambiguous legal territory that extends beyond the context of random roadside stops.
In R v. Dedman, the Court found that the police were protecting society from the harms caused by impaired driving, and therefore any interference with one’s liberty was justifiable.[15] The Waterfield test and its application in Dedman operated as support for the expansion of police powers relating to search and detainment.[16] It is important to recognize the rights and liberties Canadian citizens are relinquishing in the name of police powers and the social good of deterrence.[17]

Endnotes:
[1] Richard Jochelson, Kirsten Kramar, & Mark Doerksen, The disappearance of criminal law: police powers and the Supreme Court (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2014) at 20.
[2] Richard Jochelson & David Ireland, Privacy in Peril: Hunter v Southam and the drift from reasonable search protections (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019) at 71.
[3] Ibid, at 76.
[4] R v Dedman, [1985] 2 SCR 2, at para 2, 20 DLR (4th) 321, (ONT CA) [Dedman].
[5] Ibid.
[6] Dedman, supra note 4, at para 3.
[7] Dedman, supra note 4 at para 4.
[8] Dedman, supra note 4.
[9] Supra note 1 at 48.
[10] Dedman, supra note 4 at para 20.
[11] Dedman, supra note 4 at para 30.
[12] Dedman, supra note 4 at para 15.
[13] Supra, note 2 at 79.
[14] Ibid at 49.
[15] Ibid at 50.
[16] Supra, note 2 at 51.
[17] Ibid at 50.
Sources:
Richard Jochelson & David Ireland, Privacy in Peril: Hunter v Southam and the drift from
reasonable search protections (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019).
Richard Jochelson, Kirsten Kramar, & Mark Doerksen, The disappearance of criminal law:
police powers and the Supreme Court (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2014).





